Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her ''The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or ''I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told ''The ball is in the cup!", but not ''I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.
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Introduction
Our ability to make sense of agents' actions rests in large part on our ability to understand the mental states that underlie their actions. Critical to this understanding is the recognition that mental states sometimes conflict with reality: for example, an agent acting in a setting may hold a false belief about the location or contents of an object in the setting, or she may perceive a deceptive object as one thing when it is in fact another.
Developmental psychologists have long been interested in determining at what age children become able to attribute false beliefs and false perceptions to agents. Initial investigations suggested that this ability did not emerge until about 4 years of age (e.g., Flavell, 1988; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991 Perner, , 1995 Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ). This evidence came primarily from tasks in which children are asked direct questions about an agent's beliefs or perceptions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) . For example, in a standard false-belief task (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) , children listen to a story enacted with props: a first character hides a toy in locationA and leaves; while she is gone, a second character moves the toy to locationB. When asked where the first character will look for her toy upon her return, most 4-year-olds correctly point to locationA; in contrast, most 3-year-olds point to locationB, suggesting that they do not understand that the first character will hold a false belief about the toy's location. Similarly, in a standard
